Us Bilateral Defense Agreements

Us Bilateral Defense Agreements

If Member States do not have sufficient ex ante confidence (i.e. before the contract is signed), cooperation efforts may fail. Footnote 42 It is not surprising that the language of trust permeates the ACF negotiations. In 1995, the DCA disputed by Australia with Indonesia reflected the new reality that Australia “no longer saw Indonesia as an expansionist threat.” Australian Prime Minister Paul Keating said bluntly: “This is a declaration of confidence.” Indonesian President Suharto agreed with the assessment and said: “If there are still suspicions against Indonesia, they should be eliminated.” Footnote 43 Since trust is a necessary condition for defence cooperation, the creation of a DCA is a reassuring signal of the intention of cooperation with attentive third parties. Historically, states have attempted to report security to partners of their partners. In 1997, Romania declared that it would “increase its chances of quickly joining NATO by developing a new partnership with Hungary”, with a clear anticipation that Hungary`s Willingness to sign an agreement would reassure Hungary`s partners – NATO member countries – of Romania`s intentions. Footnote 93 The Estonian Minister of Defence similarly described a DCA with Turkey as a way to “show good relations with all members of the NATO alliance” in the hope that Turkey`s agreement would lead to the agreement of the Turkish partners. Footnote 94 And in 1998, Ukraine signed a major DCA with Argentina to assure Argentina`s defence partners, especially the United States, Ukraine`s interest in cooperating with the West. Footnote 95 The right panel in Figure 9 shows that for the sample of dyads that have signed at least one previous DCA, estimates for network variables move dramatically. The estimate for two paths remains positive, but it is now insignificant, while the estimated effect of the reciprocal degree is now clearly negative. This negative estimate, which is not expected by the theory, may be due to diplomatic restrictions; in other words, highly active countries may lack the means to negotiate new IJ DIAC. On the other hand, the experience of high-level countries makes it easy to conclude agreements that are less likely to be replaced. Footnote 118 As I briefly show, the content of this estimate is in any case small.

I also find a positive estimate for the average power, which, combined with the result for countries without a prior CAD, reinforces the hope that, once they have established trust through a first DCA, they will continue their cooperation with powerful partners. I get an unexpected negative estimate for the conformity of weapons in this equation; However, as the appendix shows, this result is sensitive to operationalization. The world of defence agreements is vast. The treaty`s archives reveal agreements on everything from war cemeteries to military mapping to nuclear material.